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Introduction
Since the 1960s, metaphysics has flourished in Anglo-American philosophy.
Far from wanting to avoid metaphysics, philosophers have embraced it in
droves. There have been critics, to be sure; but the criticisms have received
answers and the enterprise has carried on.
Matters have been different outside the so-called ‘analytic’ philosophical
tradition, and particularly so in theology throughout the past century.
Witness, for example, Kevin Hector’s recent book, Theology without Metaphysics,
which takes as a starting point the idea that metaphysics is a thing to be avoided,
a succubus from whose embrace we must struggle to extricate ourselves.1 In
the opening chapter Hector writes:
Modern thought has engaged in a recurrent rebellion against metaphysics.
. . . This recurrent rebellion against metaphysics indicates that although we
moderns may want to avoid metaphysics, we have a hard time doing so. It
would appear, in other words, that metaphysics is a kind of temptation: we
want to resist it, but find it difficult to do so. (p. 2; emphasis in original)
As it arises in theology, the temptation towards metaphysics is supposed
to have its origin in our natural propensity to speak positively and
substantively about God. Cataphatic theology, so the reasoning goes, is
inherently metaphysical. So our propensity to engage in it constitutes a
temptation towards metaphysics. In turn, the concern about metaphysics
is that it results in both idolatry and violence – idolatry because it shifts
our attention away from God and onto a simulacrum of our own creation,
and violence because it denies the otherness of God and forces God into
creaturely categories. Would-be theologians are thus offered a dilemma:
apophatic theology on the one hand, idolatrous and violent theology on the
other.
In Theology without Metaphysics, however, Hector seeks a middle ground. He
offers a broadly Wittgensteinian theory about the nature and deployment of
human concepts and predicates with the goal of showing how both can be
1 Kevin Hector, Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language and the Spirit of Recognition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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applied to God in a non-metaphysical way. In this way, he hopes to show
that cataphatic theology is not inherently metaphysical, and that one can
therefore engage in it without falling into idolatry or violence.
In what follows, I will argue that Hector has not succeeded in forging
a path between the horns of the aforementioned dilemma. I shall begin
by attempting to identify the proper target of the ‘idolatry’ and ‘violence’
objections and to provide a clear statement of each. I will then explain
Hector’s proposal and show how it is supposed to provide a non-metaphysical
way of doing substantive, cataphatic theology. In the third and final section,
I will highlight five difficulties which beset Hector’s view.
Objectionable metaphysics
Despite his provocative title, Hector is explicit about the fact that he does not
mean to argue that theology can or should be done without metaphysics of
any sort. Rather, his aim is simply show how theology can be done without
falling into metaphysics of a particular objectionable sort. Just what sort is that?
There are several ways in which one might distinguish metaphysics from
other forms of theorising. One might characterise it by its subject matter,
its methods, its presuppositions or some combination of these. Hector
and his interlocutors (to some extent following Heidegger) seem to treat
objectionable metaphysics as a mode of inquiry defined primarily by its
guiding assumptions.
Hector identifies objectionable metaphysics with what he calls essentialist-
correspondentist metaphysics (‘ECM’ for short). ECM, according to Hector, is
the attempt to secure human knowledge by identifying the fundamental
reality of objects – their being as such – with our ideas about them. . . .
[W]hat sets [it] apart [from other forms of metaphysics] is precisely an
understanding of the being of beings – their essence – as that which must
correspond to the ideas of a human knower. (p. 8)
Note that it is one thing to say that the essences of material objects do or
must correspond to the ideas of human knowers, and quite another to identify
those essences with human ideas. Since the ‘correspondence’ requirement is
plausibly entailed by the ‘identity’ requirement, it is perhaps best to suppose
that it is the correspondence requirement at which he intends to take aim.
Doing so provides Hector with a more expansive target. Thus, we might
say that objectionable metaphysics is just ECM, construed as the view that
the being, or essence, of any object that falls within the purview of our
theorising corresponds (in some sense) to human ideas.
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I am not convinced, however, that ECM is the proper target of the idolatry
and violence objections as Hector characterises them; nor am I convinced
that it is the characterisation of metaphysics that those who raise such
objections themselves have in mind. So I would like to suggest an alternative
characterisation.
For Marion and Heidegger, both of whom loom large in Hector’s text,
metaphysics involves putting the ‘being of beings’ – i.e. the being of things
in the world, as opposed to God, or the ultimate ground of being – on a par
with Being itself, and assuming that the latter grounds but can be accounted for
or explained in terms of the former.2 The idea that Being itself can be explained
in terms of the ‘being of beings’ amounts, in practice, to the supposition
that human concepts – concepts shaped by the experience of beings in the
empirical world – can be used to characterise God.3
In a similar vein, Levinas, who does not feature prominently in Hector’s
discussion, but who is nevertheless strongly associated with the idea that
metaphysics is violent,4 takes metaphysics to be the ‘promotion of the Same
2 There are various technical senses of ‘world’ in Heidegger, but I do not mean to
invoke any of those here. (Cf. Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity
[Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999], part 2.) As to why metaphysics
involves putting the being of beings on a par with Being and assuming that the latter can
be explained in terms of the former, the reason is that metaphysics is concerned both
with the ‘being of beings’, but also with their ground – the highest being, Being, which
Heidegger identifies with the ‘god of philosophy’. (Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans.
Joan Stambaugh [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002], pp. 70–2.) But insofar
as metaphysics seeks to ‘represent beings as such’, it does so ‘with an eye to their
most universal traits’ and ‘only with an eye to that aspect of them that has already
manifested itself in being’. (Heidegger, ‘Introduction to “What is Metaphysics”?’, in
William McNeill [ed.], Pathmarks [Cambridge: CUP, 1998], pp. 287, 88.) Here then we
may identify a guiding assumption: to investigate something in metaphysical mode is to
do so under the supposition that its very essence can be understood in terms of universal
characteristics that have been made manifest in beings – i.e. mundane things. But the
ultimate ground, Being, is not a mundane thing; and so the supposition that it can be
understood via concepts and categories crafted for understanding beings is suspect. Thus
one finds Heidegger speaking of overcoming metaphysics, a goal that is accomplished just
when one manages to ‘think the truth of Being’. (‘Introduction’, p. 279. Cf. also Jean-
Luc Marion, ‘Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology’, trans. Thomas
A. Carlson, Critical Inquiry 20 [1994], pp. 572–91.)
3 On the relation between Being and God, see e.g. Heidegger, Identity and Difference,
pp. 70–2; Heidegger, ‘Introduction’; and Marion, ‘Metaphysics and Phenomenology’.
For both, Being understood metaphysically – the god of philosophy, or of ontotheology
– is but an idol. But it is an idol often enough confused with God.
4 But see n. 7 below.
63
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Feb 2016 IP address: 129.74.250.206
scottish journal of theology
before the other, the reduction of the other to the Same’.5 The Same, for
Levinas, is the thinking subject; so the idea here is that metaphysics presumes
(objectionably) that the objects of our study are relevantly just like us – that they
can be classified according to our own category system, understood in terms
of our own familiar concepts acquired by way of our own perspectivally
conditioned experience of the world.
My own inclination, then, would be to characterise ‘objectionable
metaphysics’ as follows. To engage in objectionable metaphysics is to conduct
inquiry in a kind of ‘self-centred’ mode, one which tacitly privileges one’s
own conceptual scheme and cognitive capacities as the standard by which
the world is to be understood. It is, in particular, to approach a phenomenon
that we wish to study or understand as if the following three claims are true
of it. First, it is a being or object like me and like other things with which
I am acquainted. Second, it is similar enough to me and these other things
to be understood in terms of the same fundamental categories (univocally
applied). Third, to whatever extent I fail to understand it, the failure is not
due to defects or limitations in such concepts as I have or could acquire by
further experience but rather to my failure to have a sufficiently wide range
of experiences to have the concepts I need in order adequately to grasp the
phenomenon I am studying. (I will generally speak of these three claims
as ‘presuppositions’ involved in objectionable metaphysics, though I do not
really mean to suggest that they are always or even typically explicitly or self-
consciously assumed.) The violence and idolatry objections, as I understand
them, apply most saliently to an approach towards God which treats God as
just another object of inquiry to which human concepts can univocally be
applied.
Let us begin with the idolatry objection. Idolatry for Marion is not the
creation or worship of religious idols. It is a broader concept. To fall into idolatry
is to direct one’s thought towards a simulacrum of the phenomenon about
which one aims to think or theorise rather than towards the phenomenon
itself. This happens when one fails to allow things to ‘give themselves’ in
their own way, or to appear on their own terms, presuming (tacitly, via our
intention to locate them within our own conceptual schemes) that they will
appear only in ways which conform to our concepts. Hence Tamsin Jones’
characterisation of idolatry in Marion:
5 Jeffrey L. Kosky, Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 2001), p. 9. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans.
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2005), pp. 43, 45–6.
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[Idolatry] is the constraining of any phenomenon within limits alien to
the way it gives itself or shows itself. Defining the phenomenon according
to one’s own subjective conceptual limitations is . . . idolatrous.6
Accordingly, Hector construes idolatry (of the relevant sort) to involve the
subjection of God to human conditions for the experience of the divine;
and he takes Marion to think that concepts are themselves a kind of ‘human
condition’ (p. 16). But if that is right, then it looks as if idolatry will
be a danger anytime we take it for granted that God can be understood
within the confines of human conceptual schemes. The proper target of the
idolatry objection, then, is not ECM, but rather objectionable metaphysics. I
have construed it, most saliently (though not exclusively), as the view that
concepts apply to God.
Now to the violence objection. Hector characterises it in two separate
places: once in discussing the work of Heidegger, and again in discussing
the work of Caputo. As Hector understands Heidegger, the concern is that
metaphysics (ECM in particular)
ends up equating an object’s fundamental reality with that which fits
within the bounds of [human] categories. The danger is obvious: if one
thinks that one’s preconceived ideas correspond to an object’s fundamental
reality, one may be tempted to force the object to fit one’s conception of
it, whether because one fails to see anything beyond one’s conception or,
worse, because one tries to make it conform to that conception. (p. 11)
Later, characterising Caputo, he writes:
Language is violent, according to Caputo, in as much as it seeks to fit
objects within its horizon, to pin them down, and to hold them within its
grasp. This being the case, Caputo reasons that ‘there really is nothing we
can say about God that is not violent in the sense that it does not cast God
in certain terms, that it does not subject God to a certain horizontality, and
so set up something anterior to God, with a kind of ontological violence’.
(pp. 20–1)
(The notion of ‘ontological violence’ in play is left unexplained in both
Hector’s text and Caputo’s, but traces to Levinas. More on this below.) Thus,
the core of the violence objection, as Hector sees it, is this: applying concepts
to God is violent because it ‘cuts God down’ to creaturely size, force-fitting
God into ‘antecedently defined’ human categories (p. 49).
6 Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion: Apparent Darkness (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 2011), p. 9.
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The objection thus construed seems to depend on an understanding of
concepts according to which nothing can strictly and literally satisfy a concept
F unless it exactly resembles, with respect to its F-ness, some other creature
that strictly and literally satisfies F (cf. Theology without Metaphysics, pp. 49–50).
One way, but not the only way, of motivating this idea is to suppose that
concepts are just human ideas which arise out of experience, and that the
extensions of concepts are classes of objects which exactly resemble in some
particular respect other objects which lie within our experience. If this sort
of view is right, then to say (for example) that God is wise is to say that
God is at best paradigmatically wise in the creaturely way. It is surely hyperbolic
to say that this violently ‘cuts God down’ to creaturely size; but it is easy
enough to see that it would at least result in a distorted vision of God.
Thus far the violence objection, as Hector characterises it. But I am not sure
that this fully captures the fundamental worry that the objectors have in mind.
Here I think it is illuminating to consider the way in which Levinas (who
is not among Hector’s primary interlocutors) associates metaphysics with
violence. For Levinas, as we have seen, metaphysics is ‘the promotion of the
Same before the other, the reduction of the other to the Same’.7 It is, in other
words, a tacit denial of the otherness of the other, a failure to allow the other to
‘appear’ on his/her/its own terms. In less colourful and evocative language:
one is engaged in metaphysics to the extent that one takes as a methodological
starting point the idea that the others one encounters are similar enough to
oneself that they can be accurately understood and characterised in terms of
one’s own concepts and categories, without regard for the possibility that
they might in fact transcend those categories or somehow otherwise elude
characterisation within one’s own familiar conceptual scheme. In doing this,
one (conceptually speaking) forces the other into a pre-cut mould; and this
is where the association with violence comes in.
Violence, for Levinas, ‘does not consist so much in injuring and
annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play
roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not
only commitments but their own substance, making them carry out actions
that will destroy every possibility for action’ (Totality and Infinity, p. 21). One
might, of course, challenge this characterisation of violence; but, taking it
as read, it becomes easy to see what the connection between violence and
metaphysics is supposed to be. In metaphysics, one denies the alterity of the
7 For purposes here, I conflate metaphysics and ontology. The distinction matters to
Levinas (Totality and Infinity, pp. 42ff.); but what I am calling objectionable metaphysics is
appropriately assimilated to what Levinas calls ontology (and to what I think even he
would describe as objectionable metaphysics).
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other; one ‘tries to integrate the other into [one’s] project of existing as a
function, means, or meaning’.8 In so doing, one thereby risks ‘reduc[ing]
the other to his countenance’, which, in turn, risks making the other to play
a role in which she no longer recognises herself. In this way, the ‘reduction
of the other to the Same’ amounts to an exercise of power over the other. As
Burggraeve puts it:
In [reducing the other to myself] I approach the other not according
to his otherness itself, but from a horizon or another totality . . . I
look the individuality of the other, so to speak, up and down, forming
a conception of him not as this-individual-here-and-now but only
according to the generality of a type, an a priori idea, or an essence.
. . . The ‘comprehending’ I, or ego, negates the irreducible uniqueness
of the other and tries to conceive of him in the same way as he does the
world. Comprehensive knowledge is thus also no innocent phenomenon
but a violent phenomenon of power. By my ‘penetrating insight’ I gain
not only access to the other, but also power over him. (p. 36)
These remarks apply all the more strongly when the relevant other is God,
who is supposed to be radically other.
Caputo seems to have something quite similar in mind. Consider, for
example, the following excerpt from the same essay from which Hector
draws:
You see the idolatrous functioning of the metaphysical concept: the
concept seizes God round about, measures the divine by humanly
comprehensible standards, holds the look of the mind’s eye captive, and
cuts off the infinite incomprehensible depths of God. Lacking infinite
depths, the metaphysical look is accordingly not sent off into the distance
but is reflected back onto itself. A metaphysical concept of God, let us say
that of the causa sui, is an image of the metaphysician. It is not inspired but
constructed, not infinite but finite, not an excess but an incision into the
divine.9
8 Roger Burggraeve, ‘Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of
Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility’, Journal of Social Philosophy 30
(1999), p. 30.
9 John D. Caputo, ‘How to Avoid Speaking of God: The Violence of Natural Theology’,
in Eugene Thomas Long (ed.), Prospects for Natural Theology (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1992), p. 132.
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The concern about idolatry is in the foreground; but Caputo’s broader concern
is violence, and the key ideas in this passage resonate strongly with those in
the quotations from Levinas and Burggraeve in the previous paragraph.
Note, however, that the differences between these various ways of
casting the objection pertain not to the target (which is, again, simply the
presupposition that God can be understood in terms of human concepts)
but rather to the reasons for thinking that metaphysics treats the objects
of our theorising violently. Moreover, it appears that the Levinasian reason
for thinking that metaphysics is violent is quite similar to Marion’s reason
for thinking that it is idolatrous. In both cases, the fundamental problem
is that the metaphysical presupposition occludes the (perhaps quite radical)
otherness of our objects of study.
So the violence and idolatry objections, as I understand them, are mainly
directed not at ECM but at objectionable metaphysics as I have characterised
it; and they apply most saliently to the supposition that human concepts
apply (univocally) to God. Assuming this is what puts us at risk of shifting
our attention away from God and onto a simulacrum, it is what most clearly
manifests our tacit denial of the radical otherness of God, and it is what
constitutes our attempt to ‘force’ God to fit human categories.
Responding to the objections, then, will involve establishing each of the
following theses:
(1) Assuming that our concepts apply to God does not risk shifting our
attention to a simulacrum.
(2) Assuming that our concepts apply to God does not deny the radical
otherness of God.
(3) Assuming that our concepts apply to God does not ‘force’ God to fit into
human concepts and categories.
Although Hector does not cast his project in these terms, his philosophy
of language is crafted so as to guarantee each of these theses. In the next
two sections, I shall summarise the main components of his view, and then
highlight what I take to be its central problems.
Hector’s proposal
Hector’s main goal is to show that language is non-metaphysical in
the following sense: concept application does not force objects into
predetermined creaturely categories, nor does it presuppose that concepts
express or correspond to the essences of the things which satisfy them. Key
to accomplishing this goal is the deployment of a robust theory of concept
use, meaning, reference and truth evaluation. Here I shall focus primarily on
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what Hector has to say about concept use, but I shall begin by laying out the
main components of the overall theory.
Hector summarises his philosophy of language helpfully as follows:
I propose a[n] . . . account of language, according to which (a) to use a
concept is to intend one’s usage as going on in the same way as certain
precedents and to claim this same precedent status for one’s own usage; (b)
the meaning of a concept is a product of the normative trajectory implicit
in a series of such precedents, which entails that a concept’s meaning
changes, if only slightly, each time a candidate use is recognized; (c) to
refer to an object is to link up with a chain of precedents that carries on
the normative commitment implicit in an initial picking-out, in such a
way that one inherits (and renders further inheritable) that commitment;
and (d) to judge some proposition to be true is to see it as going on
in the same way as one’s other commitments and to use it to judge still
other propositions. One can thus arrive at an account of concepts that
do not ‘contain,’ of meaning without ‘meanings,’ of reference without
‘presence,’ and of truth without ‘correspondentism’. We arrive, in other
words, at an account according to which language might be fit for God-
talk. (p. 38)
Note that, thus far, we have only the claim that language might be fit for God-
talk. To show that it is fit for God-talk – that theology can be done without
idolatry or violence – Hector adds a further component to his theory. This
further component is a story about how ordinary concepts come to apply to
God; and central to this story is a view about the work of the Holy Spirit.
Drawing on the work of Schleiermacher, Hector develops a view according
to which the Spirit of Christ works so as to shape the meanings of our concepts
in a way which makes them applicable to God. The details of this theory are
complex; but for present purposes the following rough summary should
suffice. According to Hector, Jesus taught his disciples how to follow him;
he also recognised them as competent at doing so and as competent judges
of what counts as following him. They, in turn, did likewise for others, and
so on down through the history of the church. This is important because,
by virtue of his own divinity, Christ himself faced no problem in applying
concepts to God; he was able to ensure that the ‘normative trajectories’
implicit in his own use of the concepts he applied to God had God as their
‘fulfilment’. (Whatever else it might imply, having God as the ‘normative
fulfilment’ of a concept guarantees that the concept is applicable to God.)
Furthermore, Hector thinks, learning to follow Christ is, in part, a matter
of learning what it is to ‘go on in the same way as Christ’ in one’s own
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God-talk. Learning to ‘go on in the same way’ as someone in one’s own use
of concepts, in turn, involves becoming attuned to the normative trajectories
implicit in the ways the other person uses her concepts. It is this sort of
attunement that, with the aid of the Holy Spirit, has been passed down by
and through the church so that we twenty-first-century theologians can go
on in the same way as Christ and can reliably recognise others as doing
so. Thus, Christ’s own ways of using concepts are among the normatively
authoritative precedent uses for our own, and they are linked to our own
God-talk via a chain of further precedents, all of which go on in the same
way as Christ’s.
So, in short, we can apply concepts to God because Christ’s concepts
applied to God, and at least some of the concepts which we apply to God
are continuous with Christ’s. This does not tell us just how many of our
concepts apply to God; and, as we shall see, real sceptical monsters lurk in
the neighbourhood. But I shall leave that concern to be developed later.
The question now is why exactly this view allows us to say that concepts
apply to God without falling prey to the idolatry and violence objections as
they were characterised earlier. Hector takes the answer to lie in part (b) of
the executive summary of his position:
the meaning of a concept is a product of the normative trajectory implicit
in a series of such precedents, which entails that a concept’s meaning changes, if only
slightly, each time a candidate use is recognized.
One might question the entailment claim: is it really impossible for there to be,
over time, a perfectly stable normative trajectory in the usage of some concept?
Has, for example, the meaning of the concept of pi changed in (say) the
last twenty minutes as the concept has been introduced or employed in a
myriad elementary school classrooms? But never mind this for now. What
is important is just the claim that concept meaning does change over time
with use; and that meaning is a function of the concept’s inherently unstable
and therefore not entirely predictable normative trajectory. The result is that concepts
are open-ended and vaguely bounded in their extensions. In other (perhaps
more familiar) terms: concepts are vulnerable to semantic drift, so much so
that it is indeterminate to what objects they might eventually apply.
From this, then, it is supposed to follow that concepts do not necessarily
correspond to fixed, unchanging essences of things. Nor do they necessarily
correspond to or constitute ‘predetermined’ or even well-defined categories.
According to Hector,
if a concept is the product of a series of precedent uses, and if this series
changes every time a new use is recognized as carrying it on, it follows
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that concepts are continually being reconstituted. This means . . . that it
makes no sense to talk about the meaning of a concept being fixed by its
application to creaturely reality . . . (p. 97)
This is partly because it makes little sense to talk about ‘the meaning’ of a
concept, and partly because concept meanings are not fixed. Furthermore, it
follows on this view that applying a concept to God does not imply that God
exactly resembles any creaturely paradigm; for, on this picture, the extension of
a concept is not determined by anything like exact resemblance to paradigms.
Thus, according to Hector, applying concepts to God no longer threatens to
‘cut God down to size’, forcing God into merely creaturely categories. Nor
is it plausible to think of concept application on this view as contributing
essences to things. After all, if what it means to say (for example) that God
is wise might change over time, it is hard to see why one should think
that calling God wise makes God into something which is essentially (and
thus unchangeably) characterisable by the present content of the concept
wisdom. Likewise, Hector might say, once we appreciate the fact that concepts
work in this way, concept application does not even threaten to distort our
vision of God; nor does it threaten to ‘make [God] to play a role in which
[God] no longer recognizes [God-self]’; nor does it ‘reduce [God] to [God’s]
countenance’. For it will be built into the very idea of applying concepts to
God that much is being left out and that the sands are always vulnerable to
some shifting. Thus the violence objection is addressed.
Nor does it ‘subject God to human conditions’. According to Hector,
‘the norms by which one assesses one’s [theological] concept use are not
external to God – and neither are the concepts themselves. On the present
account, one learns how to use theological concepts by submitting one’s
performances to Christ, and one is able to submit them to Christ through
the power of the Spirit. . . . One conceptualizes God through God, which is
to say that one conceptualizes God by grace alone’ (p. 96). This then does
away with the concern about idolatry.
Problems
As noted earlier, there are further components to Hector’s overall theory
which merit close attention and serious discussion. But I think that the
material thus far presented provides a clear enough picture of where the
view is going for us to see some of the problems it will face. In this section,
I shall discuss five problems, each of which strikes me as rather serious.
Let us begin by noting that one possibility not at all ruled out by Hector’s
theory is that there are, after all, sharply bounded (non-vague) properties
which ‘correspond to’ or serve as the content of our concepts, and that
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the instability of our concepts over time has simply to do with the fact
that concepts take different properties as their precise contents at different
times, depending on vagaries of usage.10 Indeed, we might even suppose
that there are determinable properties (like being wise) which always serve as
the ‘normative fulfilment’ of the concepts (like ‘wisdom’) to which they
correspond, but that the precise content of the concept at any given time
is some determinate of the determinable (for example, Socratic wisdom, or
creaturely wisdom, or some other more specific sort of wisdom). On this picture,
everything that Hector says about how concept meaning depends on ‘going
on in the same way’ as precedent uses, and about the instability of concept
meaning, might still be true; but it will nonetheless be a picture according
to which concepts, despite their instability, may still correspond to fixed
properties, or categories.
Now consider this fact in light of Hector’s stated goal of ‘free[ing] us
from the metaphysical picture of concepts, according to which one’s use of
a concept corresponds to an essence-like idea or “meaning” and so [also]
free[ing] us from the sense that concept use fits objects into pre-determined
categories’ (p. 48). What is a predetermined category? One answer is that it is
nothing more or less than a sharply bounded property which objects might
or might not objectively, mind-independently exemplify. But if this is right,
then by not ruling out the possibility described in the previous paragraph,
Hector’s view fails to free us from the problematic ‘metaphysical picture of
concepts’. Concepts will still correspond to determinate properties, and so, in
applying them to objects, we will still be sorting things into predetermined
categories. Note, too, that they will still be characterisable as familiar, human
categories; for the properties to which our concepts correspond would, in
order to secure the correspondence, have to be humanly graspable.
Moreover, if predetermined categories are nothing other than mind-
independent, non-vague properties, Hector’s talk of ‘freeing us’ from the
metaphysical picture of concepts does not make sense. For to say that objects
objectively and mind-independently exemplify certain properties is, among other
things, to say that human conceptual activity is not part of what makes it the
case that they exemplify those properties. Thus, simply by virtue of believing
in mind-independent property exemplification we are already freed from a
picture according to which human concept usage fits objects into predetermined
categories. Objects either fit into those categories or not under their own
10 This general picture is built into the epistemic theory of vagueness, according to which
the vagueness of a term or concept (like bald) is simply a result of our ignorance of the
sharp boundaries on the property to which it refers. For a thorough and classic defence
of epistemicism, see Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (New York: Routledge, 1996).
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steam, as it were. Human concept usage does not generate the facts about
how objects fit into categories; it simply tries to represent those facts.
Another alternative – and the more plausible one, in light of what has
just been said – is that the predetermined categories that Hector has in mind
are mind-dependent essences. Suppose, for example, that being a statue is not an
objective property of a gold statue, but rather depends in some way upon our
thinking of it as a statue rather than (say) as a mere lump of gold. Hector’s
view, of course, implies that the concept ‘statue’ might shift in meaning over
time; so the view allows for the fact that what counts now as a statue might
not count in the future (or might not have counted in the past) as such. But
it doesn’t follow from this that applying the concept now to this particular
piece of gold doesn’t fit the piece of gold into a predetermined category.
Indeed, on this picture, our thinking of the piece of gold as a statue (rather
than a mere piece of gold) is part of what makes it a statue, and it is part of
what gives the statue persistence conditions like being unable to survive being recast
in the shape of a cube which are not otherwise had by a mere piece of gold. So
here too it seems that Hector’s theory of concepts fails to achieve his goals.
Second problem: Suppose we grant that Hector’s theory succeeds in
showing us how concepts (in general) can apply to God. Still, it is not
clear that the theory shows us how ordinary concepts can apply to God. In
showing how we can use his model to illuminate theological concept use,
Hector writes:
one’s concepts are applied correctly to God . . . if they are faithful to God’s
revelation in Christ, and they count as such if they go on in the same
way as precedent applications which carry on the normative trajectory
that stretches back to Christ. . . . To count as using (Christian) theological
concepts . . . one’s use must be recognizable as trying to carry on the
normative trajectory implicit in this chain [that stretches back to Christ]
(p. 95)
This is all fair enough; but the thing to notice is that the criterion for
the use of Christian theological concepts is not a criterion for the use of
ordinary concepts. Thus, unless it can be shown that, as a matter of contingent
historical fact the normative trajectory implicit in the use of some ordinary
concept C is recognisably identical to the normative trajectory implicit in some
chain of precedent uses which stretches back to Christ, we have no reason
for thinking that C is a ‘Christian theological concept’, and so no reason for
thinking that C properly applies to (the Christian) God.11
11 Note that the point here does not depend on interpreting ‘going on in the same way’
as equivalent to ‘going on in the same identical way’. Hector has informed me (personal
73
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Feb 2016 IP address: 129.74.250.206
scottish journal of theology
To illustrate, consider the concept ‘wisdom’ as it is used in the predication
‘God is wise’. Suppose we grant that Christians who say that God is wise are
recognisably trying to carry on a normative trajectory implicit in a chain of
precedent uses of the term ‘wise’ which stretches back to Christ. Suppose
further that we grant that, by virtue of this, ‘wisdom’ applies to God. Still,
it does not follow that any ordinary concept applies to God; for it does not
follow that the theological concept ‘wisdom’ is identical to (or even intelligibly
related to) the ordinary concept which goes by the same name. To show that
wisdomtheological = wisdomordinary, we would have to show what Hector has not:
namely, that the normative trajectory implicit in non-theological uses of the
concept ‘wisdom’ is recognisably the same as the normative trajectory implicit
in the chain stretching back to Christ of precedent uses of the theological
concept. I do not know how one could show this; but without showing this, it
seems that Hector’s philosophy of language inadvertently gives victory to the
apophatic theologians. Ordinary concepts do not apply to God. Rather, we
can speak of God only in a special theological language, employing concepts
which, for all we can tell, may not even be intelligibly related to our ordinary
ones.12
Third problem: Thus far I have been assuming that Hector’s theory of
concept usage is viable, at least in broad outline. But this too is questionable.
For Hector, concept usage depends upon judgements to the effect that one
concept is the same as another; it also depends upon the existence and
recognition as such of precedent uses. Thus:
To use a concept is to recognize the concept use of others as having a
certain normative authority over one, and to claim this same status for
one’s own use. To count as using a particular concept, one’s usage must
be recognizable as using the same concept as others, which is to say that
it must go on in the same way as uses that are recognized as precedential
– that is, as uses of the concept in question. (p. 62)
But it is easy to see why the requirement that there be recognised precedent
uses will pose a problem. Assuming one has to use a concept in order to
introduce it, the requirement implies that concepts can never be introduced.
conversation) that he intends ‘same’ in this context to be understood more with the
sense of ‘similar’ than with the sense of ‘identical’. Nevertheless, even granting this,
it seems that the non-theological concept of wisdom is identical to the theological
concept of wisdom only if the normative trajectory of the one is identical to that of the
other.
12 Note that semantic drift together with the bifurcation of Christendom into different
theological communities means that we might not even be using the same theological
concepts as other Christians.
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It also implies (absurdly) that behind every instance of concept use is an
infinite series of precedent uses (since any precedent use will count as the
use of a concept only if it goes on in the same way as some precedent). Of
course, one can fix this problem by stipulating that one can also use concepts
without precedent at the moment of introduction. But then one faces a
dilemma: either concept introduction is always violent (and theological
concept introduction always idolatrous) or else Hector’s elaborate story about
how concept use depends on normative trajectories implicit in chains of
precedent uses is ultimately irrelevant to thwarting the idolatry and violence
objections.
But what of the claim that concept usage depends upon judgements to
the effect that one concept is the same as another? Here we face a dilemma.
Either the judgements must all be explicit, or not. Suppose they must all be
explicit. Then we face a vicious regress. Why? Because making the judgement
‘A is the same concept as B’ involves applying the concept ‘sameness’ to A
and B. In order to apply that concept to A and B, however, I have to judge
that my concept ‘sameness’ is the same concept as one involved in precedent
applications of the term ‘sameness’. To make this judgement, however, I
have to use the (or, better, a) sameness concept again; and to do that, I have
to judge it to be the same as precedent uses, thus using another sameness
concept, and so on.
Better, then, to say that the judgements need not be explicit. And, indeed,
this is what Hector does seem to say (pp. 64ff.). Hector speaks of the ‘implicit
recognition’ that one instance of concept usage goes on in the same way as
others, and he also seems to want to allow that one can ‘implicitly try’ to
go on in the same way as others (which is good, because otherwise trying
to go on in the same way as others would generate the same regress of
concept application) (pp. 81–2). But now we face in spades the problem of
determining when a person (or even we ourselves) intends to go on in the
same way as someone else. Suppose I say that God is wise, but I am neither
explicitly (i.e. consciously) judging myself to go on in the same way as Christ
nor explicitly intending to go on in the same way as Christ. We might ask what
makes it the case that I am doing these things. But even if we waive that worry,
Hector’s conditions for concept usage require not only that I be doing them,
but also that I be recognisably doing them. But if I have not even acknowledged
to myself, so to speak, the relevant judgements or intentions, how could
others recognise them in me? The cases where I am implicitly trying to
go on in the same way as Christ might be indistinguishable in practice
from the cases where I am implicitly trying to go on in the same way as
someone else who is working with a subtly but genuinely different concept of
wisdom.
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Fourth problem: According to Hector, a candidate performance counts
as going on in the same way as precedent performances if and only if
it is recognisable as such by those who know how to undertake such
performances (p. 68). But we might well ask what ‘recognisable’ means.
If the idea is that one performance goes on in the same way as another if and
only if someone who knows how to undertake such performances is capable
of forming the belief that it goes on in the same way, then concepts are a lot more
open-ended than Hector has led us to believe. Indeed, it would seem that
anything goes; for, after all, given world enough and time, together with the
fact that those who know how to undertake various kinds of performances
are always capable of forming deviant or mistaken beliefs about what goes on
in the same way as precedent performances, it would seem that any concept
is capable of morphing in virtually unlimited ways. On the other hand, the
idea might simply be that there are fixed (and recognition-independent)
standards for ‘going on in the same way’ as precedent performances, and
that satisfying these standards somehow guarantees that people who know
how to undertake the relevant performances can see whether the standards
are satisfied. If this is right, however, then every concept will have fixed
boundaries after all, for present uses of a concept count as such, on this view,
only if they go on in the same way as all of their precedents. But if concepts
have fixed boundaries, then they start to look like fixed, predetermined
categories after all.
Finally, a fifth problem: Consider the concept of using (or applying) a concept.
Marion and Caputo have a concept (call it ‘C1’) of using or applying a
concept according to which applying a concept to God is idolatrous and
violent. Hector has a concept (call it ‘C2’) of using or applying a concept
according to which it is not the case that using or applying a concept to God is
idolatrous or violent. However, if Hector is to be taken as responding to Marion
and Caputo rather than simply talking past them, C2 must be identical to
C1. Or, at the very least, the two concepts must overlap significantly in their
meaning. But in order for that to be the case, Hector must be ‘going on in
the same way’ as Marion and Caputo; and it is not immediately evident that
he is. Admittedly, neither is it evident that he is not. The term ‘going on in
the same way as’ is rather vague. He is clearly not going on in a way identical
to that in which Marion and Caputo are using the term. But, as discussed in
n. 11, ‘going on in the same way’ in fact requires only that he be going on
in a sufficiently similar way.
How similar is sufficient? It is hard to say; but there is at least some
evidence that Hector’s way of going on is not sufficiently similar to Marion’s
and Caputo’s. For one thing, we know that his concept of a concept is different
from theirs. Hector’s idea of concepts, elaborated so thoroughly in his book,
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is intended as a rival to the idea of concepts which gives rise to the idolatry
and violence objections. Insofar as Hector has also developed his own theory
of concept usage (also intended to contribute to defusing the objections), we
have good reason to think that his concept of using a concept – and so his
concept of applying a concept – is different from theirs. If that is right, then we
should probably deny that Hector intends to go on in the same (relevantly
similar) way as Marion and Caputo. Indeed, it seems clear that he means to
urge all of us to go on in a relevantly different way from them in our own
usage of words like ‘concept’ and ‘apply a concept’. If I am right about this,
then, by the terms of his own theory, Hector is not so much responding to
Marion and Caputo as he is simply talking past them.
Conclusion
I have argued in this article that, despite its ingenuity, Hector’s theory of
concepts and concept application is not adequate to the task of rescuing
cataphatic theology from the idolatry and violence objections. Assuming
those objections do not fail for other reasons, the dilemma thus remains:
apophatic theology on the one hand, or idolatrous and violent theology on
the other.
Despite what I have argued in this article, however, my broader sympathies
do lie with Hector and other cataphatic theologians. I agree that the dilemma
is a false one; I believe that cataphatic theology can be done without idolatry
or violence. This is not the place to develop my own response to those
objections in detail. However, I would like to close with a few very brief
remarks reporting my own view of where the objections go wrong.
Both objections turn on the idea that applying concepts to worldly
phenomena somehow distorts our vision, so much so that it is no longer the
phenomena themselves that we have in view but rather idols, and so much so
that we do a kind of violence to the phenomena by reducing them to what
is familiar and humanly graspable, and by privileging our own particular
perspective on them, rather than allowing them to appear on their own
terms and attending to them in ways which respect their alterity.13 The idea
seems to be that, in providing what we take to be an objective theoretical
description of something in terms which are familiar and intelligible, we
will somehow inevitably take ourselves (incorrectly) to have a full, complete
and perfectly accurate grasp of something which in fact can never be fully,
completely, or perfectly accurately grasped; or, worse, we will inevitably make
it the case that the thing is as we conceive of it rather than simply allowing it
to be what it is in and of itself.
13 On the privileging of our perspective, cf. Heidegger, Ontology, pp. 63–4.
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The latter, of course, is a danger only if the anti-realists are correct and
human conceptual activity plays a role in constructing the world.14 To the
extent that the idolatry and violence objections depend on this sort of anti-
realism, I think that that is where they go wrong. The answer, then, is not to
reconceive the nature of human concepts and human concept application as
Hector tries to do, but rather to reject the underlying picture of how concepts
relate to objects and their properties.
As to the former – the idea that concept application somehow presupposes
that our grasp of worldly phenomena is more complete and accurate than it
ever could be – I think that the answer is again not to reconceive the very
nature of human conceptualisation but rather to cultivate an appreciation
for the richness of the properties to which many of our concepts refer.
Heidegger says (with many others in his wake) that ‘the difficulty lies in
language’ (Identity and Difference, p. 73). My own view, on the other hand, is
that such problems as there are in this neighbourhood lie more in our own
contingent attitudes towards the objects about which we theorise and the
things that we say about those objects. To say that God is wise, for example,
is (as I see it) to say no more or less than that God has a certain rather familiar
property – wisdom – a property also had by many human beings. In saying
this, we might presume many further things: that wisdom is a universal, God
is a particular, and God exemplifies wisdom; that divine wisdom has exactly
the same qualitative character as human wisdom; that our grasp of wisdom
as we experience it in humans is so thorough as to allow us to deduce many
other things about God from the simple thesis that God is wise; that wisdom
is part of God’s essence, and that in grasping wisdom (and maybe a few
other familiar properties) we have a thorough and secure understanding of
the totality of the divine essence, and so on. We might presume these things,
but we need not do so. All of these claims and more are up for grabs as we
theorise further about what we mean when we say that God is wise, about
the extent to which that claim can be thought of as literal or metaphorical,
and so on. Divine wisdom must bear some intelligible relation to human
wisdom in order for the predication to be apt; but we might well be ignorant
of exactly what that relation amounts to. So long as we steadfastly maintain
this understanding of the limits on what it means to say things like ‘God is
wise’, it is hard to see how the idolatry and violence objections can have
any real purchase. So, in the end, I think that we can have theology without
14 It is perhaps worth noting that Heidegger, at any rate, seems to reject this brand of
anti-realism. Ontology, p. 63.
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idolatry or violence. My difference with Hector simply concerns the reason
why.15
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